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2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey shows that workers’ support for free trade decreases
with age. The relation between age and supporting free trade is a phenomenon previously
unexplored by economists. We study distributional e ects of trade liberalization, in partic-
ular age and gains from free trade, using a dynamic structural general equilibrium model.
The method we use here is complimentary to Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (forthcom-
ing), and can handle a much richer treatment of ex-ante, endogenous and unobserved worker
heterogeneity. This more e cient method allows us to calculate distributional e ects of
trade liberalization in detail but it requires a completely di erent estimation strategy, which
comes at a cost of more computation time and stronger assumptions on workers’ expecta-
tions. After estimating the structural model with U.S. data sets NLSY and CPS, we simulate
a hypothetical trade liberalization in metal manufacturing sector (which has been especially
vulnerable to trade shocks in the past, the steel industry in particular). We show gradual
adjustment of labor allocation, wages and prices in response to this trade shock. We ﬁnd
a “mirror e ect”where very young workers in the metal sector are moderately worse o 
and older workers are extremely worse o , while young workers in manufacturing sector are
moderately better o  and older workers are extremely better o .
JEL Classiﬁcation: F1, D58, J2, J6
Keywords: Trade Liberalization, Sectoral Mobility, Labor Market Equilibrium.
1Ko¸ c University, Department of Economics. Email: eartuc@ku.edu.tr, contact info available at:
http://www.econart.com.
11 Introduction
Recently, trade economists have developed dynamic structural models to analyze e ects
of trade liberalization. Only a few of those structural models were designed to analyze
welfare e ects of free trade on workers, while many of them, especially those which generated
a large body of reasearch, focused on ﬁrms rather than workers.2 Most of the research on
distributional e ects of trade liberalization on workers have been conducted via reduced form
regressions.3 Although reduced form regressions helped economists to answer many questions
about e ects of trade policy shocks, there are certain very interesting questions that can not
be answered by them, such as: How long will it take to reach the new steady state after a
trade shock? What are the welfare e ects on export-sector workers? How do workers adjust
to free trade in case of delayed trade liberalization - if it is not implemented yet? What
are the non-pecuniary welfare costs of trade liberalization? Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(Forthcoming) developed a method to answer such questions (henceforth ACM), within a
dynamic structural general-equilibrium framework.4 The theoretical foundation of ACM
was introduced by Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008). Although ACM’s method was
well suited to analyze welfare e ects of trade liberalization, it was not designed to study
distributional e ects in detail. Studying distributional e ects seriously requires extremely
large data sets, when detailed worker heterogeneity is introduced to their model. This is
because their estimation strategy relies on aggregate mobility matrices for each observed
worker type, which could easily be contaminated with empty cells if the state-space is ﬁnely
partitioned.
In this paper, we develop a di erent method, complementary to ACM, which can be used
to study distributional e ects of trade liberalization at a cost of longer computation time
and stronger assumptions on workers’ expectations. The model we introduce in this paper
is also inspired from Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008) similar to ACM, but the
main di erence is we do not use their (computationally cheap and compact) Euler-equation
condition approach. Instead, we calculate expected values of workers similar to structural
discrete choice models in the labor economics literature, which allows us to introduce a richer
2Such as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003).
3Among others, some prominent examples are Revenga (1992), Pavcnik, Goldberg and Attanasio (2004)
and Kletzer (2002). See Slaughter (1998) for an overview.
4Among others, we can list Davidson and Matusz (2001), Ritter (2009), Helpman and Itskhoki (2009)
and Kambourov (2003) as examples of structural trade models with a special emphasis on labor.
2treatment of ex-ante and endogenous worker heterogeneity compared to ACM. With the in-
troduction of ex-ante and endogenous worker heterogeneity (age, education and experience),
we can analyze distributional e ects of trade liberalization in more detail in addition to dy-
namics of the adjustment process. Another di erence is, we use NLSY data set along with
CPS, which provides detailed work history. Using work history of workers, we model human
capital accumulation process joint with sectoral mobility. By doing so, we can calculate
welfare loss of import competing sector workers, who lose their sector speciﬁc human capital
as their sector shrinks, and welfare gains of exporting sector workers at the same time. The
ﬁnal major di erence is the sector opening to free trade, in contrast to their analysis on the
manufacturing sector, we focus on liberalization in the metal manufacturing sector. Since
metal manufacturing output is not directly consumed, it has no e ect on consumer price
index. Therefore, we have to allow outputs of sectors to be used as inputs in the production
function (otherwise free trade of metal manufacturing product would not directly a ect other
sectors). Studying a very small sector, such as metal manufacturing, with ACM’s method
would require an unreasonably large data set even without worker heterogeneity. 5
In this paper, we will particularly focus on e ects of trade liberalization on di erent gen-
erations. Recent Pew Global Attitudes survey, conducted in 2002, showed that young people
are more enthusiastic about free trade compared to older people. The negative correlation
between age and support for free trade is previously unexplored by economists. Without con-
sidering any economic explanation, one could attribute this negative correlation (between
age and supporting free trade), to older people’s being more comfortable with status-quo
compared to young. In other ﬁelds of social sciences, there are studies analyzing age and
openness to change, among others Na and Duckitt (2003) report that young Koreans are
more open to change compared to old. Taking those and other researchers seriously, one
can claim that older people’s being more conservative can potentially explain their attitude
towards free trade. However, we show that there is indeed an economic explanation as well
for this intriguing di erence between young and old workers, although it was unnoticed so
far by economists. We do not deny the possibility of existance of psychological factors, which
are out of the scople of this paper.
Imagine that all workers were perfectly mobile across sectors, then all workers would be
5Needless to say that their method also has some other advantages over ours. For example, it requires
shorter time series since their method does not rely on calculation of future values.
3unanimously better o  or worse o  after trade liberalization, as in Heckscher-Ohlin model.
If all workers were absolutely immobile and attached to certain sectors, then there would
be clearly distinct winners and losers from free trade; in that case, workers’ sectors would
determine their gain and loss. In reality, mobility costs probably lie between these two
extremes and vary across groups. A major source of variation in mobility has to do with the
age of a ected workers, causing di erences in their position towards free trade.
In order to explore the relation between worker mobility, age and welfare e ects of free
trade, we ﬁrst estimate human capital accumulation process and mobility of workers jointly
with a sectoral choice model, using NLSY and CPS data. Then, we calibrate production,
input demand and consumption demand functions to set a general equilibrium framework
with the estimated sectoral choice parameters. Finally, we simulate a hypothetical trade
liberalization in the metal manufacturing sector (which has been especially vulnerable to
trade shocks in the past, the steel industry in particular) to analyze gradual adjustment
of labor, wages and prices in all sectors in response to this trade shock. The trade shock
can be considered simply as an exogenous reduction in the metal manufacturing product’s
price, as cheaper imports will be available with trade liberalization; everything else will be
endogenous.
It should be noted that, although we put a special emphasis on human capital accumu-
lation process, our ultimate goal is to simulate trade shocks, which will make our model
di erent from similar research in labor literature such as Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee
and Wolpin (2004). We are borrowing some insights from sectoral/occupational choice liter-
ature to analyze a topic which can not be explored with other international trade economics
tools. We deviate from them by modeling sectoral choice rather than occupational and edu-
cational choice, since a trade shock ﬁrst hits sectors, then possibly occupations in a less direct
way. Analyzing e ects of trade liberalization on occupations is out of the scope of this paper,
and left for future research. In addition to this deviation, we reduced the state space by
using a limited number of age, education and experience groups, so that the counterfactual
simulations are computationally feasible. This simpliﬁcation decreases the computational
burden signiﬁcantly by reducing the time needed to calculate value functions, which makes
our model relatively easy to implement compared to other longitudinal-structural models.
Since we have endogenous wages and multiple sectors, most of the models developed by labor
4economists would not be computationally feasible for our purpose. Finally, we have included
idiosyncratic utility shocks in addition to wage shocks, similar to Sullivan (2004) and ACM.
Inclusion of these shocks is necessary because deviations in wages can only explain a very
small part of labor mobility, see two papers mentioned earlier for more discussion.
One important question is: Why old workers are less mobile than young workers? Fol-
lowing the previous literature we can give several di erent answers to this question: For
example Borjas and Rosen (1980), attributed decreases in mobility with age to increases in
wages with tenure. The decrease in mobility with age can be attributed to speciﬁc human
capital as in Topel (1991), better job match as in Jovanovic (1979) or implicit contracts as
in Lazear (1979). Groot and Verberne (1997) suggested that the decrease in mobility with
age can be partially attributed to non-ﬁnancial reasons as well. Unfortunately, we will not
be able to incorporate all these features in our model at the same time: we assume that
workers become less mobile as they get older because they become more likely to hold sector
speciﬁc human capital and the other reasons will be captured by their implicit moving cost
a la Groot and Verberne (1997). Although models of sector speciﬁc human capital is less
common in the literature compared to ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital; Neal (1995) shows that
it is a very important part of human capital.
Another related line of research to ours is the displaced workers literature, such as Ja-
cobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993). Although they also analyze distributional e ects of
trade liberalization, their analysis is focused on import competing sector workers only. They
study only import-competing sector workers with a natural experiment, therefore their re-
sults can be considered as more precise, however they can not explain what will happen in
a hypothetical scenario and what will happen in other sectors, such as service.
In the next section we will present the model, followed by estimation results. After a
section on counterfactual simulation of trade liberalization in metal sector, we will introduce
unobserved heterogeneity to the model. Then we will conclude the paper.
2 Model
Consider an economy with I industries, where workers choose a sector to work dynam-
ically in each period. Aggregate production functions for each sector has a Cobb-Douglas
5form, where workers’ wages are marginal product of labor derived from the production func-
tions. Workers preferences are also expressed with Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Our goal
is to simulate a hypothetical trade liberalization in one of the sectors (metal manufacturing)
and see how labor allocations, prices, wages and option values adjust after the trade shock.
We will discuss welfare e ects of this policy change on workers from di erent age, education
and experience groups. The parameters of the workers’ problem are estimated from NLSY79
and CPS, while the parameters of the production functions are calibrated from BEA data.
The industries are aggregated into 4 main sectors: 1. “Manuf”: Manufacturing and
Agriculture (tradable sector), 2. “Metal”: Metal Manufacturing (sector subject to policy
change) 3. “Service”: Service except Trade (non-tradable sector) 4. “Trade”: Wholesale
and retail trade (another non-tradable sector). The industries are aggregated mainly in two
groups, tradeable and non-tradeables. However, since “wholesale and retail trade” is a very
large industry, we decided to take it as a separate sector apart from service.6
In the next sub-section we will describe workers’ problem.
2.1 Workers
Assume that there are N workers and I sectors in the economy. Workers choose a sector
in which to work in each period. If a worker indexed by n decides to work in sector i then
dn
t = i where
d
n
t  {1,2,3,4}. (1)
A worker, n, receives wage wni
t from working in sector i. Wage of worker n is deﬁned
as the price of sector speciﬁc human capital, ri










6A more favorable approach is to use two digit deﬁnitions to separate industries which have di erent
characteristics than the others such as Agriculture, Professional, Government, and to include occupational
choice as well. There are two reasons that prevent us from doing so: First, Increasing number of choices will
make the problem computationally infeasible. Second, the main dataset we use, NLSY79, has a fairly small
sample size, especially for metal workers, therefore estimates of important sector speciﬁc parameters would
not be signiﬁcant.
6where units of human capital is deﬁned as
logh
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where Colln is a dummy for college education, SecExni
t is years of sectoral experience in
sector i, MktExn
t is years of market experience and zni
t is an iid normal random shock. Since
we are interested in ﬂuctuations in ri
t, we will not derive the standard Mincer wage equation
from this speciﬁcation but rather move in a slightly di erent direction. For convenience, let
us deﬁne loghni
t =  i
0 +Xni
t  i +zni
t , where Xni
t is a vector of individual characteristics,  i is
a vector of sector speciﬁc human capital parameters except the intercept  i
0. We can write
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t is the average wage in sector i and ¯ hi
t is the average human
capital in sector i.




t in such a way that they can only take the following values:
Age
n







Although estimation of the model without discretizing these variables could be possible,
simulation is not feasible with endogenous wages. To accommodate for discretization, we
assume that in each year a worker with age, A, moves to the next possible age, A + k, with
7a probability 1/k, where k = 7 in this case7. When a worker reaches age 54 there is a
1/k probability that she will receive a lump-sum money and retire, to keep the population
constant we assume that a new worker enters system for each retiree. When age increases
market experience increases as well until 18 and does not increase further. Sectoral experience
will evolve depending on workers decision to stay in their current sector, the maximum value
for sectoral experience is also 18.8 See Artuc (2006) for additional details.
If a worker changes sector, her sectoral experience is reduced to the minimum level. 9 If
she stays in the same sector and her age increases at the same time, her sectoral experience
increases to the next level:
if d
n
t  = d
n
t 1 =  SecEx
ni


























t 1 + 7.
In addition to the wage, each worker n, receives an idiosyncratic random utility, uni
t , from
working in sector i. Where uni
t is distributed mean zero extreme-value with variance  2
6  2,
see Patel, Kapadia and Owen (1976) for properties of the extreme-value distribution. Hence
















t) is a function of the state variable st, random shock zni
t and
aggregate state variable  i
t as described above. The aggregate state variable  t is a vector





] . The non-random state vector sn
t is consist of education, previous period’s choice, sectoral
7Figure 16 shows how value functions of manufacturing workers would look like with k=1 (actual) and
k=7 (approximation) using estimates from the next section.
8Estimating the life-time wage-tenure proﬁle is out of the scope of this paper. We were not able to
identify tenure-wage proﬁle of workers above 40. We simply assume that for the last two age groups wage
contribution of market and sectoral experience stay constant following the general shape of tenure-wage
proﬁle estimated in previous works, such as Mincer (1958).
9Unlike Keane and Wolpin (1997) we are keeping a one-dimentional sectoral experience variable in order

















The non-random state vector sn
t can also be considered as type of a worker. Workers who
move from sector i to j will incur a moving cost, Cnij, if they change their sectors, so Cnij > 0
if i  = j and Cnij = 0 if i = j. If a worker changes her sector, the moving cost will be a










this moving cost should not be taken literally as “ﬁnancial cost”, it will account for all
unmodelled frictions and psychological costs as well.
For notational simplicity, consider a vector of all relevant state variables,  n
t , for individual
n, which are sn
t ,  t, zn
t =[ zn1
t ..znI
t ]  and un
t =[ un1
t ..unI
t ] , such that  n
t =[ sn




objective of an individual for any time t =1 ,...,T is to maximize her present discounted
total utility following a Bellman equation:
Vt ( 
n































































































   
, (10)
and note that  i
t+1 ( n
t ) can be calculated analytically upto a certain level. {See Appendix
B for details. }
Timing:
At any given time period t the order of events for a worker is as follows: 1. Pays the
9moving cost C>0 if her previous sector is di erent. 2. Works and enjoys her utility:
wni
t +uni








j=1. 4. Chooses her sector.
5. Enters the next period t+1 and repeats steps 1-5 for t+1. Note that there is no aggregate
uncertainty in the model except for the shock therapy (e.g.  t, t+1, t+2,..., T,... are known
at time t).
Estimation of workers’ problem:
Using the equations above we can calculate probability of a worker’s transition from
state s to s  {see Appendix B for details.} let us denote this probability with mss , which is
a function of sn
t and expected next period alternative-speciﬁc values for each state.
In addition to the transition probabilities mss , it is also possible to calculate probability
of observing wage wn
t given n’s type sn
t and average wage in her sector: ¯ wi
t. The estimation





















Note that it is possible to solve the integral over un
t analytically in a way similar to multi-
nomial logit models, however, the integral over zn
t has to be calculated numerically with
a quadrature or simulation based method. Thus, we use “method of simulated maximum
likelihood” to estimate the parameters of interest. { See Appendix B for details. } Note that
since some of the important distributional parameters, such as average sectoral experience of
workers over 40, are not observed in the data. We calculate those parameters during the es-
timation process, then we repeat the estimation procedure recursively until the distribution
of workers converge to a ﬁxed point.
2.2 Aggregate Economy:
Let l(s) be the ratio of workers with a given state s  {1,...,S}, where s is an index
representing type of a worker, where total number of workers are normalized such that
1=
 S
s=1 l(s). There are 96 possible states thus S =96 types of workers (determined by all
possible combinations of Colln, SecExni
t , MktExni
t and dn
t ). For any given type s we can





st 1stl(st 1). (11)
Let Lt be a vector representing the distribution of workers such as Lt =[ l(1) ... l(96)]
 .
Consider a vector ¯ Vt( t) which is consist of ¯ V i
t (s, t) for all possible states s =1 ,2,...,96
where ¯ V i
t (s, t)=EV i
t ( n
t ). Then Lt can be expressed as a function of previous period’s




Lt 1, t, ¯ Vt( t)
 
, (12)
where  t is a vector of average wage and human capital levels. Average wages are endogenous
























t is the ratio of workers in sector i, where Li
t =
 
s Si l(s) and Si is the set of
types of worker where dn
t = i (types that are from sector i), ¯ hi
t is average human capital,
Ki is capital, and q
ji
t is amount of product from sector j used in production in sector i.
We assume that capital is speciﬁc to sectors similar to Ricardo-Viner models as in ACM.
(We also experimented with perfect capital mobility simulations and found that qualitative
implications of the model, in general, are unchanged).
Each worker will receive her real marginal product, given price level pi
t and consumer




























Therefore the average wages can be written as a function of Li
t and ¯ hi
























t is a part of the Cobb-Douglas production function,  i


















  j , (17)
where q
jc
t is quantity of j consumed at time t and  j’s are the weights. In the next section
we discuss estimation results of workers’ problem and calibration of production functions.
3 Estimation and Calibration of Parameters:
We are interested in estimation to ﬁnd plausible parameters for the simulations, thus in
cotrast to papers from labor economics literature, our main focus will be counterfactual trade
liberalization simulations. We estimate human capital accumulation and mobility parameters
jointly, from each worker’s simulated likelihood contribution. Then we calibrate production
function parameters from Breau of Economic Analysis data, assuming Cobb-Douglas forms.
Data
For estimation of the workers’ problem, we use 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (henceforth NLSY) as our main data set. NLSY is widely used in esti-
mation of occupational choice models, since it follows individuals over years and provides
detailed information on work history. The sectoral experience variable, SecExni
t , can be
easily constructed from NLSY. One important restriction of NSLY is it follows individuals
annually until about age 40, so we can not identify parameters for older individuals in the
model. In order to identify moving cost parameter Cnij for individuals over 40 we include
Current Population Survey March sample (henceforth CPS) in our estimation. Since sectoral
experience is not observed in CPS, we can not use it to calculate likelihood contribution of
observed wages. The average wages are also calculated using CPS because NLSY sample
size is much smaller.
Initially, NLSY has 12,686 people in the sample, consisting of 6,403 males and 6,283
12females. Like most of the other mobility models, we only pick males for our sample (such
as Keane and Wolpin (1997) and ACM). Moreover, we take blacks and Hispanics out of our
sample, who are over-sampled by the NLSY, again following the previous research. This
reduces our sample size by approximately 40%, so we are left with 3,790 individuals. The
individuals in our sample are between ages of 14 and 21 as of year 1979. We use observations,
from years 1983 to 1994, of individuals who were at least 23 years old, worked at least 26
weeks in the observed year and who do not have any missing industry information from
previous years. For example if a certain individual’s data is missing for 1990, we do not use
him after 1990 since we can not construct sectoral experience data for him after the missing
observation. If a certain individual is observed less than 7 years between 1983 and 1994, we
take him out from the sample. We do not use observations of individuals whose implied full
time real annual wage income is less than $5000, or more than $300,000 (where the base year
is 2000). We end up with 1190 individuals in the sample. 10
Neal (1999) reports that there are coding errors in NLSY79 regarding occupations. A
similar error is also present for industry codings. In order to minimize this problem, we use
the following method as in Neal (1999); whenever a sector change is reported, we require that
the worker has to change his employer as well, otherwise it is considered as a coding error
and the original sector is kept. Tenure of workers with their current employer is reported in
NLSY.
The CPS sample is from 1983 to 2001 and constructed in a similar way: We use white
and male individuals, who are between 23 and 57, and who worked at least 26 weeks in a
given year. We have a minimum of 11,857 and a maximum of 20,211 people in our ﬁnal
sample between the years 1984 and 2001 (sample size changes every year). In CPS, reported
mobility rates are 5 months’ mobility rather than annual mobility, we follow a procedure
similar to ACM to correct transition probabilities.
Table 1 summarizes distribution of workers across sectors, age, sectoral experience and
education groups in both NLSY and CPS samples. Note that sectoral experience is not
available for CPS sample and NLSY sample includes people only up to age 40. Manufacturing
and agriculture workers (henceforth manuf.) are approximately 27%, metal workers are about
4%, service workers except trade workers (henceforth service) are about 49% and ﬁnally
10Keane and Wolpin (1997) end up with 1373 individuals in their ﬁnal sample following a similar method.









23 to 29 58.8% 18.6%
30 to 36 41.2% 25.4%
37 to 43 NA 23.4%
44 to 50 NA 18.5%
51 to 57 NA 14.3%
Panel C: Sectoral Experience
Experience NLSY CPS
1 to 7 86.0% NA
8 to 14 14.0% NA





14wholesale and retail trade workers (henceforth trade) are close to 20% of the total sample
(see Panel A). Unlike ACM, our analysis does not rely on calculation of aggregate transition
probabilities, which allows us to have a very small sector, such as metal. Calculation of
aggregate transition probabilities requires observing some workers from each sector moving
to every possible direction, which is impossible when one of the sectors is small or when
there are many worker types. Panel B shows age distribution and Panel C shows sectoral
experience distribution in the sample. As illustrated in Panel D, about 40% of workers have
at least one year of college education in the sample.
Table 2: Transition Probabilities (CPS).
Panel A: No College Education
Age Manuf Metal Service Trade
23 to 29 0.067 0.076 0.055 0.090
30 to 36 0.041 0.050 0.032 0.061
37 to 43 0.030 0.035 0.021 0.041
44 to 50 0.022 0.035 0.017 0.036
51 to 57 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.026
Panel B: Some College Education
Age Manuf Metal Service Trade
23 to 29 0.065 0.085 0.039 0.104
30 to 36 0.041 0.065 0.019 0.060
37 to 43 0.032 0.048 0.015 0.046
44 to 50 0.033 0.046 0.011 0.042
51 to 57 0.025 0.050 0.010 0.033
Panel C: Transition Marix
Manuf Metal Service Trade
Manuf 0.963 0.002 0.025 0.011
Metal 0.019 0.954 0.020 0.007
Service 0.011 0.001 0.977 0.011
Trade 0.017 0.002 0.039 0.943
Table 2 shows example transition probabilities from di erent age groups, education
groups and sectors. Panel A presents probabilities of sector change for workers with no
15college education while Panel B shows for those with at least one year of college education.
The e ect of education on probability of sector change is ambiguous. However, it is clear
that probability of sector change is decreasing with age for both education groups. Panel C
shows transition probability from one sector to another. As one would expect, probability
of moving out of a larger sector is lower than probability of moving out of a smaller sector,
and probability of moving into a larger sector is higher than probability of moving into a
smaller sector.
Estimation Results
Wages are deﬂated by the CPI, and normalized so that over the whole sample the average
annualized wage is equal to unity as in ACM. We ﬁnd that the variance of preference shocks
is extremely large: The parameter of the extreme value distribution   is about 1.5 (reported
in Table 3 - Panel A) which means that standard error of the idiosyncratic utility shock is
approximately equal to 1.9. In the Table 4 - Panel A the standard error of wage shock.  z
is reported as 0.41. The estimation results show that idiosyncratic shocks and unmodelled
frictions play a very important role in decision of workers.
The estimated moving cost, reported in Table 3 - Panel B, starts from 4.5, increases
with age, and end up being as large as 5.9 for the oldest type. These numbers are large
but not surprising since similar projects with idiosyncratic utility shocks such as Sullivan
(2006), Kennan and Walker (2003), and ACM also report such large mobility costs. For
example ACM ﬁnd a moving cost equal to 6.5 times of average annual wage. We will present
estimation results of an extended model with unobserved heterogeneity to shed some light
on possible reasons of this unrealistically large moving costs in a later section. Panel C
shows the sector speciﬁc component of the moving cost, which is how much more (or less)
the moving cost would be depending on the sector a person chooses to work in. The moving
costs reported in Panel B can be 3.2 more if a worker is moving to metal sector (which is
the smallest sector) or 1.5 less if a person is moving to service sector (the largest sector).
Panel D shows that people with some college education bear larger moving costs, this can
be attributed to the fact that people with more education earn higher wages. Because of
higher wages, their wage o ers ﬂuctuate more in levels (obviously not necessarily in logs),
hence for a similar mobility rate, as reported in Table 2, people with more education should
face larger moving costs.
16Table 3: Estimation - Moving Cost.
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Shock Parameter
Coe cient t-stat
  1.50 13.06
Panel B: Age speciﬁc cost
Parameter Age Coe cient t-stat
C1
1 Age 26 4.55 13.59
C2
1 Age 33 5.02 12.86
C3
1 Age 40 5.07 10.08
C4
1 Age 47 5.32 9.73
C5
1 Age 54 6.08 9.59
Panel C: Additional sector speciﬁc cost
Parameter Sector Coe cient t-stat
C1
2 Manuf 0.00 N/A
C2
2 Metal 3.24 11.15
C3
2 Service -1.73 -12.00
C4
2 Trade -0.72 -7.93
Panel D: Additional education speciﬁc cost
Parameter Education Coe cient t-stat
C4 College 2.90 2.90
17Table 4: Estimation - Human Capital.
Panel A: Std. Dev. Of Wage Shock
Coe cient t-stat
 z 0.413 317.97
Panel B: Education Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
1 Manuf 0.131 8.96
 2
1 Metal 0.060 2.37
 3
1 Service 0.200 13.73
 4
1 Trade 0.160 11.35
Panel C: Sectoral Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
2 Manuf 0.025 14.28
 2
2 Metal 0.012 2.66
 3
2 Service 0.032 22.70
 4
2 Trade 0.037 18.21
Education Coe cient t-stat
 4 College -0.008 -4.83
Panel D: Market Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
3 Manuf 0.007 4.32
 2
3 Metal 0.011 3.36
 3
3 Service 0.004 2.77
 4
3 Trade 0.000 0.18
Education Coe cient t-stat
 5 College 0.011 5.61
18Table 4 reports estimates of the wage equation related parameters. Panel B shows that
return on education is the highest for service sector and the lowest for metal sector. This is
an expected result since sectors like professional, ﬁnance, public are parts of service sector.
Return on sectoral experience for di erent sectors and education levels is shown in Panel C.
Return on sectoral experience varies between 0.012 to 0.025. This high return on sectoral
experience contributes to the high moving cost of older workers. 11 Finally, Panel D reports
the return on market experience (which is equivalent to age in our model, since we do not





j and  i
A are calibrated from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
data, they are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 . We simply assume that cost
shares of labor and inputs are parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production functions. We
pick  i
A’s such that observed average wages are as close as possible to the implied wages,
given the distribution of labor. The parameters of Cobb-Douglas utility function,  i’s are
calibrated from Consumer Price Index data, which are reported in Panel C of Table 5 . ACM
and Artuc (2006) also follow a similar calibration method and provide more detail. For the
estimation and the simulations, we assume that discount factor   is equal to 0.96. We were
not able to estimate   since it is poorly identiﬁed by our model.
4 Simulation:
4.1 Autarky Steady State:
As ﬁrst step for the counterfactual exercise, we simulate autarky steady state to calculate
the initial labor distribution, Lt, which will gradually converge to the free trade distribution
after the trade shock. Here we use the subscript A instead of t to refer to any time period
before the shock. Although we call it autarky for notational simplicity, we assume that there
11The return on sectoral experience we ﬁnd here can potentially be upward-biased, as we do not model
occupational choice. A very recent paper by Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) showed that at one-digit
level, return on sectoral experience is about half of return on occupational experience. In our data about
52% of workers who change sectors change occupations as well, while 49% of workers who change occupations
change sectors as well. To capture e ects of occupational and sectoral mobility more accurately, we need to
add occupational mobility to our model, which is left for future research. Sensitivity analysis of simulations
with alternative sectoral experience values are available upon request.
19Table 5: Calibration - Production and Utility Functions.
Panel A: Production Function Input Shares
Manuf Metal Service Trade
Labor 0.18 0.25 0.37 0.37
Capital 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.27
Manuf 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.04
Metal 0.05 0.29 0.01 0
Service 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.3
Trade 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
Panel B: Production Function Constant
Manuf Metal Service Trade
log i
A 10.8404 9.0984 10.6266 9.75
Panel C: Utility Function Shares
Manuf Metal Service Trade
 i 0.4 0 0.6 0
is actually trade in the manufacturing sector before the liberalization in the metal sector.
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A ]  is the vector of autarky average wage and human capital levels, ¯ Xi
A is the average of
human capital parameters used in wage equation (3). For simplicity we assume that pi
A =1
and  A = 1. Note that  i
A and ¯ hi
A can be calculated from LA, since they are ratio of workers
and average human capital in sector i respectively, where LA is distribution of types in the




































Deﬁne XA =[ w1
A .. wI
A ¯ VA LA] , the simulation exercise can be deﬁned as a problem of
ﬁnding a ﬁxed point XA = F (XA) where F (.) is a function described by the set of equations
(18). The ﬁxed point is calculated numerically, similar to Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2008).
4.2 Transition:
We assume that with the abolishment of tari s in the metal sector, the prices will decrease
about 30%, thus pMetal =0 .7 when t>0. First, we have conditions for the transition, similar
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However this time we can no longer assume that pi
t = 1 or  A = 1, since prices change
during transition. In addition to prices the inputs used in production will also change, thus
the parameter  i
t will be di erent from the calibrated parameter  i
A. We normalize these
parameters with their autarky values, such that ˜ xt denotes xt/xA. The change in consumer
price index can be calculated with the change in prices







  i (20)
21The change in prices (for service and trade) can be calculated with the change in income
spent on each product and quantities produced, simply by exploiting the Cobb-Douglas form






























The change in  i























Finally, the change in output can be written as a function of change in total human capital

















Deﬁne vector Xt =[ w1
t .. wI
t ¯ Vt ˜ y1
t .. ˜ yI
t ˜ p1
t .. ˜ pI
t] , and matrix X =[ X1 X2 .. XT]. We assume
that for t>T , Xt = Xt 1. Let X = G(X,LA) be a function deﬁned by equations (19),
(20), (21), (23) and (22). Finding the transition values is also equivalent to ﬁnding a ﬁxed
point given the autarky labor allocation, LA. Similar to the autarky problem, this problem
can also be solved numerically. We check if XT is indeed the free trade steady state, if not
we increase T and ﬁnd another ﬁxed point. See Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008) or
Artuc (2006) for details.
4.3 Results
We ﬁrst simulate the model for the autarky steady state, where all prices are normalized
to unity. Table 6 shows distributions, average log-wages and average education levels of
all workers along with average sectoral experience of young workers across sectors, both
for simulated autarky steady state and actual data. The calibrated production functions
combined with the structural estimates produce fairly close distributions to the actual data
22although they were calibrated and estimated seperately.
After calculating the steady state, we assume that a shock-therapy trade liberalization
in the metal sector decreases its product’s price by 30%, forcing it to be equal to the world
price at t = 1. 12 We assume that service and trade sector outputs are non-tradable, while
manufacturing sector output is tradable, which makes manufacturing price constant over
time. Given the initial autarky labor allocation, outputs and prices, we calculate transition
of labor allocation, wages, values of workers, prices, output and demand of goods after the
trade shock.
Table 6: Distribution of Workers from Simulations and Data
Manuf Metal Service Trade
Labor Data 0.27 0.03 0.53 0.17
Simulation 0.28 0.04 0.51 0.16
Log-wage Data 10.21 10.19 10.23 10.05
Simulation 10.23 10.21 10.25 10.06
College Data 0.31 0.34 0.44 0.32
Simulation 0.3 0.2 0.44 0.31
Sectoral Exp. Data 5.65 5.17 5.16 4.87
Simulation 6.32 6.88 5.8 5.59
Figures 1-3 show gross ﬂows of workers, that is percentage of workers leaving their sectors.
Figure 1 is for workers with average 4 years of sectoral experience and who are about 26
years old. Initially, approximately 19% of “trade” workers leave their sector, and 14% of
other workers leave their sector every year. After the trade shock, this percentage increases
to 29% for “metal” workers, decreases to 13% for “manuf” workers and stays approximately
the same for “trade” and “service” workers. Figure 2 presents gross ﬂows of workers with
average 4 years of sectoral experience and who are about 54 years old; while Figure 3 shows
gross ﬂows of 54 years old workers with at least 18 years of sectoral experience. The general
trend of gross ﬂows are the same in all three ﬁgures: Sectoral mobility decreases with age
and experience.
12This is basically a small open economy assumption. Since the US uses about 10% of word metal output,
a metal sector liberalization will not a ect world price signiﬁcantly. We experimented with an alternative
speciﬁcation where world price is determined endogenously and found that the qualitative implications are
unchanged. Results available upon request.
23Figure 4 shows the adjustment of wages after the trade shock: We ﬁnd that gross ﬂow
of workers are negatively correlated with wages. The adjustment process of “metal” sector
is very simple but interesting: Initially price of “metal” sector product decreases, causing
the wages in ”metal” sector to decrease. Workers start leaving “metal” sector, causing large
out-ﬂows, which eventually increases wages in “metal” sector. The long run free trade wage
in “metal” sector is, however, lower than the autarky wage. For the other sectors, the
adjustment process is quite subtle: First, it should be noted that “metal” sector product
is not consumed, but used mostly as an input in “manuf” and “metal” sectors. Therefore,
”metal” price has no direct e ect on CPI or real wages. However, the decrease in “metal”
price increases its use as an input, and increases the marginal product of “manuf” workers,
causing an increase in wages. Other sectors’ wages are do not change much after the shock.
Figure 5 displays change in output, showing a notable increase in the “manuf” output and
a very large decrease in “metal” output. Like wages, the other sectors’ outputs are not
signiﬁcantly a ected from the trade shock.
Figure 6 shows the change in demand (from both consumers and producers) for each
product. As expected, demand for “metal” increases signiﬁcantly with the price cut. Demand
for “manuf” also increases, even though there is no change in its price, because of the general
increase in output after the shock. (Since there are no market failures or externalities in our
model, it is safe to assume that GDP increases after the trade liberalization although we
do not explicitly calculate it). The demand for “service” also increases, but the change is
much smaller compared to “manuf” because ”service” price increases with demand. Note
that “manuf” price is constant as it takes the world price. Figure 7 shows change in prices.
Going back to Figure 4, the changes in “service” and “trade” prices pull the ”service” and
“trade” wages up, while workers moving into “service” and “trade” from “metal” sector push
wages down. These two opposite forces cause wages in “service” and ”trade” change only
slightly: a small increase for “service” and a small decrease for “trade”.
Figures 8-11 show how low-skill workers’ value change right after the trade shock.13 (The
results for high-skill workers are very similar and shown in Figures 12-15). Since “metal”
sector output is used intensively only in “manuf” and “metal” and not consumed, “service”
13Although we originally have only 96 types of workers, as shown in (4), we can calculate values for more
a ﬁnely partitioned state space, e.g. Age  {23,24,25,26,27,...,57}, using the aggregate distribution of
workers and wages from the simulations.
24and “trade” sector workers are less a ected from the trade shock compared to others. Note
that size of “metal” sector is fairly small and ﬂows out of metal sector do not signiﬁcantly
change labor allocations in other sectors. (We can safely ignore tari  revenues from “metal”
sector because of its small size).
Figure 8 shows that “manuf” workers, in general, beneﬁt from the shock, consistent
with the fact that output increases more compared to the increase in number of workers in
“manuf”. The gains increase with age and experience, reaching maximum level for middle
aged people who have worked in the “manuf” sector for their entire life. The gains decrease
with age after a certain age because expected time horizon to enjoy beneﬁts of free trade
decreases. When a worker is su ciently close to retirement, she would only care about
purchasing power of her retirement savings. We assume that when a worker retires, she
receives a lump-sum money which is not a function of price levels, thus retired workers are
worse o  after the shock since prices of ”services” increase after the shock. An equally
plausible assumption would be assuming an inﬂation-protected retirement beneﬁts scheme,
then retired workers would be una ected from the shock. Since the di erence is trivial we
do no show simulation results for the alternative approach. However, we believe that to shed
more light on this issue, a more detailed retirement model is required, which is out of the
scope of this paper.
Younger workers beneﬁt less compared to middle aged, because option value of younger
people decrease after the trade shock - which is a signiﬁcant portion of their value as shown
in (10). As a worker’s moving cost increases, her option value decreases, so it becomes fairly
small when a worker gets old. After the shock, “metal” sector becomes an unattractive
alternative for working in “manuf”, causing a notable drop in young “manuf” workers’ option
value. It is very unlikely for a person, who has been working in “manuf” for many years to
move to other sectors, so developments in other sectors do not change older workers’ option
value much.
Figure 9 shows change in “metal” workers’ value, which is almost the opposite of previous
ﬁgure. Young workers are hurt less because of the increase in their option value, while older
workers are hurt more. Older and middle aged workers’ inability to move to other sector
makes them lose more compared to young. The story for the workers, who are close to their
retirement, is exactly the same as “manuf” sector.
25Figure 10 displays change in values of “service” and Figure 11 shows changes in values of
“trade” workers. These two sectors are only slightly a ected from the trade shock as they
are not using “metal” in their production. “Service” workers are slightly better o , while
“trade” workers are slightly worse o . The general shape of the value functions surface is
similar to other sectors: Middle aged workers beneﬁt more if they workers beneﬁt in general,
and hurt more if workers are hurt in general (compared to young). We would like to call
it a “mirror e ect”. Trade shocks a ect older people by a large scale both positively and
negatively, while younger people are a ected usually in the same direction as older people
in their sector but by a much smaller scale. (Yet, it is theoretically possible that old people
are worse o  in import competing sector while young people are better o .)
Our results show that there is a relation between age and supporting free trade, but the
simulated trade liberalization in the metal manufacturing does not imply that old workers
would be less supportive of free trade compared to young, as it is seen in the Pew Survey.14
The counterfactual exercise presented here is of a very small sector, so the distributional
e ects of a long term globalization can not be studied from our graphs. Analyzing long term
globalization in detail and explaining results of the Pew Survey is out of the scope of this
paper. But just to shed some light on this interesting issue, we simulated an hypothetical
trade liberalization in “manuf” sector. We ﬁnd that all workers except middle aged and
older “manuf” workers beneﬁt from trade liberalization, including young “manuf” workers.
So a liberalization in ”manuf” sector could be more consistent with the Pew Survey. We
also experimented with perfect capital mobility and found that qualitative implications of
our base simulations are unchanged. (Results are available upon request).
5 Unobserved Heterogeneity: An Extended Model
As we discussed earlier, the moving cost we estimate should not be taken as a ﬁnancial
cost since there are many unmodelled frictions in the labor market which is captured by
the moving cost. In an alternative setup, we assume that there is unobserved heterogeneity,
particularly two types of workers: type I - workers who can move after paying some moving
cost, and type II - workers who can not move at all. Having these two unobserved types will
allow us to capture some of the unmodelled frictions which would otherwise be captured by
14We provide a simple analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey in Appendix C for descriptive purposes.
26the moving cost. In the original model we had 96 types, with inclusion of a binary unobserved
heterogeneity we end up with 192 types. We assume that unconditional probability of being
type II is  , probability of transition from type I to type II is  1 and probability of transition
from type II to type I is  2.
Consider this special case: If one’s type in the next period is independent of her current
type then,  1 =   and  2 =1   . For this special case, we can think of type I workers
as those who can get job o ers this year, and type II workers as those who can not get job
o ers. Then any friction captured by inclusion of unobserved types for this special case can
be considered as search frictions. Another underlying friction can be time persistence of
utility or wage shocks. If a worker likes one sector better than others, because of ﬁnancial or
non-ﬁnancial reasons, her preference this year is most likely correlated with her preference
last year. For example, the worker might be a very talented sales-person resulting in higher
wages for her in trade sector, or her spouse might also be a sales-person and she might
want to work in the same company with him. Both of these shocks are time persistent,
inconsistent with our iid assumptions. By introducing two unobserved types, we allow a
simple persistence in the idiosyncratic moving cost.
Probability of being type II unconditional on history depends on observed state of an
individual. Assume that probability of being type II given the observed characteristics is
 (st), where st is the observed characteristics (or state) of the individual. This probabil-
ity can easily be calculated from the aggregate distribution vector, Lt. Also assume that
probability that a worker will stay in her sector is   (st).
If a worker has moved in last period, we are sure that she was type I in last period, so
for her to be type I again this period is
Pr(I|st,s t 1)=1   1.
Similarly if a worker has moved two periods before today, she was a type I then so her
probability of being type I today is





11 =  1 2 + (1    1)
2   (st 1),
p
21 = (1    2) 2 +  2 (1    1)  (st 1),
p
12 =  1 (1    2) + (1    1) 1  (st 1),
p
22 = (1    2)
2 +  2 1  (st 1).
If a worker has not moved in the last two periods, the probability that she is a type I is
Pr(I|st,s t 1,s t 2)=
{1    (st 2)}  (st 2)p11 +  (st 2)p21
{1    (st 2)}  (st 2){p11 + p12} +  (st 2){p21 + p22}
.
Finally, if a worker’s history is unknown then her probability of being type I is
Pr(I|st)=1   (st).
We use these probabilities in maximum likelihood contributions of individuals. Ideally, we
could go back more in history of workers, but we prefer to go back only two periods since it is
su cient to identify the parameters we are interested in. Going back more in history would
require computing all possible paths, which is computationally (and analytically) infeasible.
Table 7 shows that estimated moving costs decrease substantially with inclusion of un-
observed heterogeneity. We now ﬁnd that moving cost parameter C1
1 is equal to 1.77 and C5
1
is equal to 3.22, while the same parameters are equal to 4.55 and 6.1 respectively without
unobserved heterogeneity. Other results presented in Tables 7 and 8 are very similar to 3
and 4. Thus parameter estimates, excluding mobility costs, are not a ected much from the
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity. Another interesting parameter is  , which is esti-
mated as high as 0.70. This can be interpreted as, 70 percent of workers can not move either
because of search frictions or time persistence of shocks. Finally, we ﬁnd that  1 =0 .37, thus
it can be inferred that unobserved types show some persistence, since it is much smaller than
0.70. When we repeat the simulation exercise for the extended model, we ﬁnd that inclusion
of unobserved heterogeneity does not change the qualitative implications of the main model
(ﬁgures available upon request). We also experimented with unobserved heterogeneity in
wage o ers (by allowing unobserved sector speciﬁc human capital), however we were not
28Table 7: Estimation - Moving Cost (Unobserved Heterogeneity).
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Shock Parameter
Coe cient t-stat
  1.19 8.95
Panel B: Age speciﬁc cost
Parameter Age Coe cient t-stat
C1
1 Age 26 1.77 3.71
C2
1 Age 33 2.33 4.61
C3
1 Age 40 2.34 4.01
C4
1 Age 47 2.59 4.21
C5
1 Age 54 3.22 4.88
Panel C: Additional sector speciﬁc cost
Parameter Sector Coe cient t-stat
C1
2 Manuf 0.00 N/A
C2
2 Metal 2.59 8.18
C3
2 Service -1.51 -9.32
C4
2 Trade -0.61 -7.94
Panel D: Additional education speciﬁc cost
Parameter Education Coe cient t-stat
C4 College 0.30 3.31
Panel E: Types
Parameter Probability Coe cient t-stat
  Pr(II) 0.70 18.25
 1 Pr(I to II) 0.37 6.12
 2 Pr(II to I) 0.15 N/A
29able to identify distributional parameters for this speciﬁcation. See Appendix A, “Unob-
served Heterogeneity 2” section for this speciﬁcation and related tables. One robust ﬁnding
we get is: With introduction of unobserved heterogeneity (whether it is in utility shocks or
human capital), estimated moving costs become smaller as unobserved heterogeneity pro-
vides addition frictions to labor mobility.
Finally, in Table 9 we compare estimated moving costs and welfare e ects of trade lib-
eralization under di erent unobserved heterogeneity assumptions. Welfare e ects are quan-
titatively close for all simulations (except for type II workers who can not move), and the
qualitative results (i.e. order of magnitude) are robust for all types. Type II workers beneﬁt
more (or hurt more) after a trade liberalization depending on their sector. This is because
type II workers have much smaller option values as they are stuck to their sectors in the
short-run.
6 Conclusion
We introduced a model which can be used to analyze distributional e ects of trade
liberalization. Our initial setting was somehow similar to ACM, but we followed a completely
di erent econometric strategy which allowed us to introduce richer ex-ante and endogenous
worker heterogeneity. Although this strategy prevented us from using their compact Euler-
equation conditions, we simpliﬁed the estimation process by discretizing state-space. Using
NLSY and CPS, we estimated mobility parameters and human capital accumulation process
jointly. With estimates of these structural parameters and calibrated production functions,
we simulated a counterfactual trade shock in metal manufacturing sector (which was subject
to shocks recently, steel sector in particular.) We ﬁnd that:
(1) Estimated moving costs are large and increase further with age. Preference shocks
are important in explaining labor mobility, therefore psychological and unobserved factors
play a crucial role in mobility decisions.
(2) High moving costs found in this paper (and in ACM) might be partially due to omis-
sion of unobserved heterogeneity, which may be caused by search frictions and persistence
of shocks.
(3) After a trade shock in the metal sector, mainly “metal” and ”manufacturing” work-
30Table 8: Estimation - Human Capital (Unobserved Heterogeneity).
Panel A: Std. Dev. Of Wage Shock
Coe cient t-stat
 z 0.412 317.97
Panel B: Education Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
1 Manuf 0.131 8.86
 2
1 Metal 0.062 2.41
 3
1 Service 0.202 13.89
 4
1 Trade 0.159 11.11
Panel C: Sectoral Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
2 Manuf 0.025 14.12
 2
2 Metal 0.013 2.91
 3
2 Service 0.032 22.67
 4
2 Trade 0.031 14.95
Education Coe cient t-stat
 4 College -0.011 -6.30
Panel D: Market Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
3 Manuf 0.007 4.34
 2
3 Metal 0.009 2.77
 3
3 Service 0.004 2.68
 4
3 Trade 0.004 2.67
Education Coe cient t-stat
 5 College 0.013 6.17
31Table 9: Comparison of Simulated Welfare E ects
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Moving Costs
Bechmark Unobserved Hetero. Unobserved Hetero. 2
Age Sec. Exp All type I type II type A type B
26 4 4.55 1.77 NA 3.14 3.14
40 4 5.07 2.34 NA 3.22 3.22
40 18 5.07 2.34 NA 3.22 3.22
54 4 6.08 3.22 NA 4.00 4.00
54 18 6.08 3.22 NA 4.00 4.00
Panel B: Welfare Change of Manuf. Workers
Bechmark Unobserved Hetero. Unobserved Hetero. 2
Age Sec. Exp All type I type II type A type B
26 4 6,528 6,361 8,116 5,483 5,901
40 4 6,659 6,457 7,823 4,671 4,970
40 18 10,908 11,060 11,760 9,241 9,545
54 4 4,271 4,056 4,578 3,414 3,498
54 18 6,743 6,667 7,009 5,911 6,027
Panel C: Welfare Change of Metal Workers
Bechmark Unobserved Hetero. Unobserved Hetero. 2
Age Sec. Exp All type I type II type A type B
26 4 -49,023 -51,314 -77,208 -45,077 -44,214
40 4 -65,082 -62,288 -84,365 -55,249 -54,620
40 18 -88,979 -86,307 -109,768 -82,806 -82,011
54 4 -46,881 -44,343 -51,641 -42,134 -42,048
54 18 -58,879 -57,736 -64,875 -55,582 -55,495
32ers would be a ected since output of metal sector is not consumed but used as input in
“manufacturing” and “metal” sectors.
(4) “Metal” workers would be worse o  in general. However, young workers would be
much less compared to middle-aged, due to their ability to move to other sectors (hence high
option values). On the other hand, “Manufacturing” workers would be better o . Again
young workers much less compared to middle-aged because of the drop in their option values.
The relevant ﬁgures display a mirror e ect in “manufacturing” and “metal” sectors.
(5) As workers get close to retirement they should be unanimous since they have less time
to enjoy or su er from the e ects of free trade on their wages. To analyze e ects of trade
shocks on very old workers, a more detailed modelling of savings and retirement beneﬁts is
required, which is left for future research.
33Appendix A: Alternative Estimations
To analyze robustness of our results we have experimented with alternative speciﬁcations.
Presentation of results and discussions are kept short to limit length of the paper.
Unobserved Heterogeneity 2
We experimented with another unobserved heterogeneity speciﬁcation, where a certain
fraction of workers receive higher returns when they work in the manufacturing sector. This
speciﬁcation is rudimental and our goal is just to show how unobserved heterogeneity in wage
o ers might a ect moving costs. We assume that a certain type of workers (type B) receive
1.5 percent higher returns than others (type A), if they work in manufacturing sector. The
new human capital equation is:
logh
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6 is the extra sector-speciﬁc human capital of type B workers, which is assumed to
be  1
6 =0 .015 and  i
6 = 0 for i =2 ,3,4. The ratio of type B workers are  , however we were
not able to identify that parameter, the estimate of   is equal to approximately 0.5 where
the t-statistics is about 0.02. We ﬁnd that with introduction of unobserved heterogeneity in
wage o ers we get smaller moving cost. See Tables and 11 for details.
Simpliﬁed Basic Model vs. Restricted Utility Shocks
In the labor literature utility shocks are not common; in similar discrete choice models,
such as Keane and Wolpin (1997), labor allocations are mainly driven by wages shocks. To
demonstrate the e ect of inclusion of utility shocks we introduce a descriptive model with a
very simple moving cost and human capital structure:
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we estimate this model using only NLSY data. Then, we repeat the exercise with a
restriction   =0 .04.
We do not set   equal to zero because otherwise we need to make substantial changes in
34Table 10: Estimation - Moving Cost (Unobserved Heterogeneity 2).
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Shock Parameter
Coe cient t-stat
  1.05 13.76
Panel B: Age speciﬁc cost
Parameter Age Coe cient t-stat
C1
1 Age 26 3.14 13.90
C2
1 Age 33 3.34 12.99
C3
1 Age 40 3.22 9.85
C4
1 Age 47 3.38 9.80
C5
1 Age 54 4.00 9.83
Panel C: Additional sector speciﬁc cost
Parameter Sector Coe cient t-stat
C1
2 Manuf 0.00 N/A
C2
2 Metal 2.32 11.62
C3
2 Service -1.06 -11.40
C4
2 Trade -0.61 -9.56
Panel D: Additional education speciﬁc cost
Parameter Education Coe cient t-stat
C4 College 0.20 3.82
35Table 11: Estimation - Human Capital (Unobserved Heterogeneity 2).
Panel A: Std. Dev. Of Wage Shock
Coe cient t-stat
 z 0.411 319.86
Panel B: Education Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
1 Manuf 0.147 10.45
 2
1 Metal 0.088 3.89
 3
1 Service 0.201 14.19
 4
1 Trade 0.171 12.60
Panel C: Sectoral Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
2 Manuf 0.027 17.15
 2
2 Metal 0.014 3.56
 3
2 Service 0.030 23.14
 4
2 Trade 0.039 21.29
Education Coe cient t-stat
 4 College -0.009 -6.01
Panel D: Market Experience Parameters
Parameter Sectors Coe cient t-stat
 1
3 Manuf 0.004 2.60
 2
3 Metal 0.010 3.83
 3
3 Service 0.005 4.18
 4
3 Trade 0.000 0.00
Education Coe cient t-stat
 5 College 0.011 5.75
Panel E: Types
Parameter Coe cient t-stat
  0.477 0.023
 1
6 0.015 NA
36Table 12: Simpliﬁed Basic Model and Restricted Utility Shocks.






Coef. 1.77 5.53 0.00 3.79 -1.85 -0.40
tstat 10.34 9.78 N/A 8.37 -6.92 -2.25
 z Sec. Exp. Mkt. Exp. College
Coef. 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.22
tstat 321.89 41.06 11.89 61.91






Coef. 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.39 -0.11 -0.20
tstat N/A 76.02 N/A 50.32 -15.49 -33.42
 z Sec. Exp. Mkt. Exp. College
Coef. 0.39 0.01 0.04 0.15
tstat 372.04 57.36 147.22 58.99
the computations. The results are shown in Table 12, Panels A and B respectively. Here,
we show the contribution of utility shocks to large moving costs. Wage shocks can be easily
identiﬁed since wages are observed. We observe that wages do not ﬂuctuate much, but
workers change sectors very often, which implies very small moving costs when preference
shocks are omitted.
Alternative initial distributions (for the year 1983)
We have to guess the initial distribution of sectoral experience for older workers in esti-
mation process, because we do not observe workers’ sectoral experience in CPS. We iterate
labor allocation equations using year 1983 wages to calibrate initial distribution of CPS
workers. Then alternatively, we iterate using average wages over the CPS sample (year 1983
to 2001). Using a simpliﬁed model (introduced above) we show that the initial disribution
of workers does not a ect our results signiﬁcantly. Results shown in Table 13 Panels A and
B.
Appendix B: Key Equations
The expected utility function used in programming can be expressed as:
37Table 13: Alternative Initial Distributions.






Coef. 1.63 5.28 0.00 3.85 -2.22 -0.61
tstat 11.64 17.14 N/A 15.32 -14.32 -6.16
 z Sec. Exp. Mkt. Exp. College
Coef. 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.18
tstat 322.47 42.27 11.74 51.78






Coef. 1.54 4.91 0.00 3.74 -1.93 -0.63
tstat 18.42 17.73 N/A 16.52 -13.62 -6.94
 z Sec. Exp. Mkt. Exp. College
Coef. 0.41 0.03 0.01 0.18





















































































































































































































































if agent is older at st.Note that st+1 should have the correct sectoral experience given st
following the process in (5). Finally the option value can be expressed as































ACM present derivation of equations similar to the ones above in detail. The main di erence
here is having an additional non-linear shock, zt, hence we take integrals over that shock
using simulations.
Appendix C: A Brief Analysis of the Pew Survey
Pew Global Attitudes survey is consist of interviews conducted in 44 countries with 38,263
individuals in 2002. It includes approximately 100 questions on various popular issues and
personal background. We are not using the survey data to estimate our main model but
to estimate a simple descriptive probit model to illustrate our motivation for this research.
A question on international trade points out a very interesting yet unexplored issue. The
question is: “And what about the di erent products that are now available from di erent
parts of the world - do you think this is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad
or a very bad thing for our country?” We ﬁnd that as people get older they are less likely to
answer this question as “good” and “somehow good”. We set up a simple probit model to
demonstrate the correlation between age and probability of supporting free trade.
39Consider that A = 1 if the individual, i, answers the question as “good” and else A = 0.
We assume that A = 1 if and only if gains from trade u is greater than a certain threshold
¯ u. We use a simple linear form
ui =  0 +  1Agei +  2Age
2
i +  3Age
3
i +  4Femalei +  5Employedi +  i,
Where   is a iid shock, Employed is a dummy for employment status which is one for
employed people and zero for unemployed, Female is a dummy variable which is one for
female and zero for male, and Age means age in last birthday minus eighteen. Estimates
show that probability of a person’s gains from trade being larger than the threshold decrease
with age (in a linear fashion). See Table 14 - Panel A for the estimates. The percentage of
people from di erent age groups supporting free trade is reported in Panel B of Table 14.
Table 14: Pew Statistics.
Panel A: Pew Probit Results







Panel B: Probability of Supporting Free Trade in the Pew Sample
Age 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s 60’s 70’s
Probability 0.374 0.353 0.316 0.302 0.277 0.238
Panel C: Probability of Supporting NAFTA in the GSS sample
Age 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s 60’s 70’s
Probability 0.661 0.610 0.571 0.602 0.449 0.447
In addition to Pew data, General Social Survey, conducted in US starting from 1972, also
has questions related to people’s perception of free trade. The negative correlation between
age and supporting free trade is also observed in GSS, but the evidence is not conclusive
since the number of respondents to these questions in General Social Survey is much smaller
40compared to Pew data. For example 1348 people gave a valid response to the question: “Does
America beneﬁt from being a member of NAFTA?” the probability of answering “Yes” again,
in general, decreases with age. See Table 10 - Panel C.
It should be noted that the questions asked in these surveys are very general; the answers
given depend on many factors not observed from the data such as one’s perception of free
trade, consumption preferences, recent changes in trade policy in their countries, skill level,
worker’s industry, and many other things which would di er from country to country and
person to person. The probit analysis and tables only show that there is, in general, a
negative correlation between age and supporting free trade in most countries for most of the
people. In the next section we set up a model to explain why age and gains from trade are
correlated. We will show that welfare e ects of trade liberalization depend on people’s age,
education and experience level as well as the type of liberalization.
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